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HAIG, NIVELLE, AND THIRD YPRES 
by Frank E. Vandiver" 
In a battle that raged from June to November, 1917, British troops under 
Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig advanced against German positions in 
Flanders. With the capture of the village of Passchendaele, the vaunted 
Third Battle of Ypres ended. Gains were balanced against Allied losses 
of nearly half a million men,' but the British commander considered his 
campaign a success. He had dented the powerful Hindenburg Line, had 
thinned German ranks by some 270,000 men, and had exhausted many 
of Germany's best divisions-all of which certainly constituted success. 
According to the relative definition of "success" in vogue on the Western 
Front in 1917, Haig might have been right. But if experience counted, 
his measure of success was challenged by an overriding question: Should 
he have launched Third Ypres at all? A recent biographer, John Terraine 
in Ordeal of Victory (1963), considers the campaign vital and suggests that 
it reflects Haig's study of the war. Did he study the war? Did it teach 
him anything?" 
Experience should be the constant tutor of generals. War in France and 
Belgium was rich in experience, most of it new and hectic. Cone were 
"the good old days" of Empire Wars. The uncomplicated tactics Haig had 
seen at Omdurman, in the South African campaigns, in India's myriad 
combats, had given way to the digging, dredging, and engineering that 
made the Western Front the epitome of modern warfare. First attempts 
at maneuver and open war had come to grief on the Marne; the "race 
to the sea" ended mass movements for inexplicable reasons. Divisions of 
horse had been hereded to France for the day of the expected 
"breakthrough"-but the day never came. All of which bewildered such 
traditional cavalry officers as Haig. War was now a siege spread across 
almost four hundred miles of Europe. 
Sieges were studied by all officers; staff colleges and military academies 
offered courses in the mechanics of entrenchment, the intricacies of regular 
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approaches as expounded by Vauban; in theory, all trained commanders 
knew how to reduce Acre, Troy, perhaps even Carcassonne. But the siege 
lingering from the Channel Ports to Switzerland was different. Few fortified 
towns were handy; instead, the lines ran along open ground and were 
often several systems deep. Such old defensive reliables as Greek fire and 
hot oil had given way to labyrinthine trenches festooned with great sweeps 
of barbed wire. So the nature of things had changed. How could the enemy's 
lines be broken so completely that the waiting cavalry might at last have 
room to range behind the battle, cut communications, spread terror, and 
disrupt logistical support to the front? 
Answers were sought with remarkable dedication by Allied and Central 
Powers generals. Answers were offered at the Marne, at Verdun, the Somme. 
The most pointed answer was offered in April, 1917, along the Aisne, when 
the offensive ordered by French General Robert George Nivelle failed. 
What happened to Nivelle, Haig knew with special clarity-he had been 
a party to the Frenchman's plan.3 Did he apply any of the lessons taught 
by Nivelle's experience when he plotted Third Ypres? 
Almost from the moment Haig took command of the British Expedi- 
tionary Force, he cast covetous eyes toward the strip of Belgian coastline 
in enemy hands. In January, 1916, he talked with Admiral Sir Reginald 
Bacon, commanding the Channel Fleet, and was impressed by the need 
to free Ostend and Zeebrugge. Loss of the channel coast would deny 
German submarines splendid operating locations,' The more Haig thought 
about the Belgian front, the more fetching it became. What if British forces 
landed behind the German lines? Not only might the ports be freed, but 
the whole German right flank might be rolled back. With any luck, the 
war might be pushed to a finish by the BEF. 
Even General Joseph Joffre, the stolid French commander, saw the virtues 
of channel operations and seems to have offered tentative support to a 
British campaign aimed at clearing Belgium.' But German attacks at Verdun 
disrupted Haig's and Joffre's hopesG Verdun became the test of France's 
endurance. Endless divisions were consumed in that cauldron of attrition. 
Pressure mounted steadily until, at last, Joffre was forced to plan a diver- 
sionary offensive. He looked to Haig's army for help. The British joined 
in the Somme campaign-a long series of battles that wasted French and 
British soldiers in frightful numbers and achieved some slight relief of 
Verdun. 
Be it said for Haig and Joffre that losses damped their ardor not a bit. 
Out of the continual grinding came a kind of faith in grinding-process 
became an end in itself. And there was always a haunting possibility in 
the background: relaxed pressure might give the Germans victory. 
By the end of 1916, Allied strategy in France and Belgium was affected 
by two major considerations: 1) the tottering state of Russia, and 2) British 
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successes in Mesopotamia. If Russia collapsed (which seemed likely), fresh 
German divisions could speed westward and shift the balance of strength 
on the Western Front. This shift could be made more decisive if the 
"easterners" among Allied planners persuaded London and Paris that the 
war might be won more economically in the Middle East. 
Cynical as it may sound, Haig and Joffre needed to commit their govern- 
ments to the Western Front by entangling them in another lengthy offensive. 
At an Allied conference in November, 1916, Joffre proposed a bald policy 
of "wearing down" the enemy during the coming year. He concluded that 
Allied numerical superiority should be used while it lasted, and urged a 
general push along the whole bat t lefr~nt .~ But these plans were victims 
of a French government crisis in December which resulted in Joffre's 
repIacement by General Nivelle. 
Nivelle's quick rise from obscurity seemed justified by his spectacularly 
successful counterattacks at Verdun. He claimed no magical powers, only 
that he had a "new plan" for quick victory. This plan, based on extensive 
artillery preparation and an "army of maneuver" in reserve, would at last 
produce the cherished "breakthrough" and win the war. The French gov- 
ernment greeted his promises of speed with glee and accepted his proposed 
battle. First, though, he had to convince the British.' 
Nivelle had panache, a jaunty, Gallic poise, dressed well, wore a very 
French moustache, looked roguish and daring, and spoke English like 
a native. To London he journeyed and presented his plan to the War Cabinet 
in mid-January, 1917. He charmed everyone. His proposal might have been 
depressing-it sounded as though he wanted to resume the Somme battle 
on tougher ground along the Chemin des Dames ridge-but he was per- 
suasive, talked of smashing German defenses and of rushing through the 
gap to cut off retreat. It would all be done in twenty-four to forty-eight 
hours, or Nivelle would stop the fight. This proposed attack along the 
Aisne depended on a preliminary British assault at Arras to draw in enemy 
reserves; once the British attracted the Germans, a massive French drive 
would start, supported by the army of maneuver's twenty-seven divisions. 
When the front broke, these twenty-seven divisions would exploit the 
opportunity.' Intense artillery preparation would obliterate or cripple op- 
posing trenches and troops before the French infantry charged-success 
was certain! Beguiled by the vision of quick victory, the British Cabinet 
rushed to agree.1° 
So desperately did Britain's leaders desire success in haste that Lloyd 
George, recently elevated to the post of Prime Minister, suggested putting 
Haig's army under Nivelle's command." Swift complaint from Haig and 
General Sir William Robertson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, halted 
this outrage, but Haig did accept a subordinate role in  the coming 
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operations. He may well have sought a subordinate role, for he had an 
eye to the future. 
Nivelle's plans, although deftly presented and initially glittering, tarnished 
under scrutiny. As French and British staff officers digested the scheme, 
obvious questions arose. What was the strategic objective? Victory is always 
the ultimate objective, but some finite measure of initial success was needed. 
Why attack against the most formidable of the enemy's defense systems? 
The naturally strong chalk bluffs of the Chemin des Dames were made 
stronger by elaborate trenches, forests of wire, and countless machine guns. 
Nivelle explained that crushing the finest enemy positions would ruin 
German moraIe.12 
The dapper general's best argument for his plan was that it had an 
obvious local purpose-to pinch off the huge Noyon salient which bulged 
between Arras and Soissons. British troops driving in from Arras to meet 
French troops coming up from Soissons would cut off thousands of Germans 
and eliminate a major part of the enemy's strongest front line. But the 
possibility of an Allied drive on the salient had long distrubed the German 
high command. In February, 1917, German leaders took a bold step and 
began evacuating the salient. Eventually enemy troops yieIded almost twenty 
miles of French soil in a retreat famed for unprecedented destruction. Short 
of sowing salt in the earth, the Germans did everything possible to devastate 
the French country~ide.'~ 
Once the Germans gave up the salient, Nivelle's offensive lost even local 
justification. But Nivelle rationalized grandly. German withdrawal helped 
him, he said, by contracting the front to be attacked and so permitting 
further concentration of French troops." A kind of hysterical certainty 
possessed Nivelle-nothing could swerve him from his battle. 
Easter Monday in Flanders dawned cold, sleet-ridden, and gray. The 
British First Army lay entrenched opposite Vimy Ridge, that sodden wrinkle 
of land so Iong beyond Allied grasp; the Fifth Army, commanded by 
General Edmund Allenby, was entombed beneath the streets of Arras-at 
least a good portion of it was huddled in a labyrinth of dug-outs and 
caves under the town and beyond it. These underground warrens were 
connected to the front line by communication tunnels; troops moving up 
through them were protected from enemy shells. Allenby's men attacked 
at 5:30 AM, and by the end of the day had advanced almost three and 
a half miles and taken over six thousand prisoners. First Army men did 
their part by taking Vimy Ridge. Haig noted that "our casualties are 
estimated at 16,000. This is small considering the three successive strong 
positions, each one deeply wired, which have been taken."" 
In a few days British momentum waned in face of stiffening resistance. 
Haig finally called off the battle on April 14, but only for regrouping.'' 
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He was committed to aiding Nivelle and hence to keeping up pressure 
on the Arras front while the French got ready to advance. 
Nivelle was having trouble getting his offensive going. Delays, frustra- 
tions, alarms, shortages, mud, all forced postponement of the drive. At 
last, on April 16, French infantry scrambled out of the trenches and marched 
forward into sheets of rain, sleet, and bullets. The Germans were ready 
for them-full information about the attack came from various sources and 
made possible preparation of a virtually impregnable front line. The assault 
failed from the start. Nivelle's forty-eight hours passed without a 
breakthrough anywhere. Two days of fighting brought 120,000 French 
casual tie^.'^ Repulsed along the whole of his front, Nivelle gave way to 
panic-the drive went on! Wave after wave of poilus dashed against the 
enemy's works until, finally, Nivelle ordered an end to the slaughter.18 
Such abject failure brought despair to France. Damage to the army's 
morale struck deeper than anyone guessed. Disillusionment stalked the 
ranks; the cynical acceptance of Nivelle's senseless plan by the politicians 
seemed the final betrayal of the soldiers. Mutiny began in the colonial 
divisions and spread to include some of the elite troops. In wake of dissen- 
sion, French offensive spirit vanished. Nivelle was replaced on May 15 
by General Henri Petain, who visited mutinous divisions and counselled 
a new program-France would wait for the Americans. This was about 
the first sensible suggestion many poilus had heard from any of their 
generals.'"ut the suggestion found no sympathy at British headquarters. 
Haig's concern was not for the wreckage of French hopes but for the 
success of the BEF. The time had now come, he believed, to press the 
Flanders offensive. He had never abandoned his project of clearing the 
Belgian ports and unhinging the German right flank. But this undertaking 
would require a quid pro quo from the French. Nivelle had, midst the 
certainty of success, agreed that if his attack failed he would cooperate 
with the Flanders venture. Now that he was gone, would Petain honor 
the agreement? Haig had his doubtsz0; French promises were scarcely to 
be trusted! Even if the French failed to assist with diversionary attacks 
in Champagne and other sectors, Haig was convinced the British must 
carry on. He put his view plainly to the Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff: "In my opinion the decision to cease offensive operations now . . . 
would be most unwise. . . . I consider that the prospects of success this 
year are distinctly good if we do not relax our efforts and that it would 
be unwise, unsound, and probably, in the long run, most costly in men 
and money to cease offensive operations at an early date."?' 
The British government pondered. What should be done? Was there 
some new path to success at an acceptable cost in men? Another Aisne 
or Somme could not be tolerated, much less justified. What choice was 
available? Haig and Robertson had answers. Both urged continued attacks 
82 RICE UNIVERSITY STUDIES 
because only through relentless pressure could the enemy be exhausted. 
There were no short cuts-attrition was the only sure system of victory. 
Robertson expounded this novel idea persuasively: "The best plan seems 
to me to go back to one of the old principles, that of defeating the enemy's 
army."" Haig put this philosophy forcefully in a memorandum for the 
General Staff and Cabinet: "The guiding principles on which my general 
scheme of action is based are those which have proved successfu1 in war 
from time immemorial, viz., that the first step must always be to wear 
down the enemy's power of resistance until he is so weakened that he 
will be unable to withstand a decisive blow; then to deliver the decisive 
blow; and, finally, to reap the fruits of v i c t ~ r y . " ~  These guiding precepts 
would be put into effect by continuing the Arras fighting for several weeks, 
then, after an expected Italian offensive began to draw off some enemy 
strength, Haig's army would start the Flanders drive. 
There hardly seemed much new in  these ideas of the CIGS and Com- 
manding General, BEF. They suggested another Somme, another Aisne. 
Had the top British command learned nothing from the war, especially 
from Nivelle's debacle? A close look at the ideas outlined by Haig and 
Robertson shows that they believed they had learned one truth from Ni- 
velle's experience-the "breakthrough" was a casualty of balanced forces 
and defenses in depth. Nivelle had erred in dash. Modern weapons and 
trench systems prompted Robertson to observe that "at one time audacity 
and determination to push on regardless of loss were the predominating 
factors, but that was before the days of machine guns and other modern 
equipment. . . . It is no longer a question of aiming at breaking through 
the enemy's front. . , . It  is now a question of wearing down and exhausting 
the enemy's resistance. . . ."" Haig echoed these sentiments. NivelIe's experi- 
ence was useful in turning attention back to military verities: "Our action 
must , . . continue . . . to be of a wearing down ~haracter."~' This hardly 
sounded like the Haig who, a scant few months earlier, had promised the 
people of England that in 19 17 "we shall break the German front complete- 
ly. " 2G 
Haig's and Robertson's assurances notwithstanding, Lloyd George, the 
War Cabinet, French ministers, all greeted the proposed Flanders offensive 
with misgiving. What could an attack against heavy German positions near 
Ypres gain when the Arras fighting had been so inconclusive? Lord Hankey, 
who shared the deliberations of the War Cabinet, confessed that no one 
believed in Haig's plan or thought much save carnage would result. But 
Haig appeared before the members and had a mesmeric effect when he 
argued for his battle. Not tall but straight, he had Edwardian elegance 
and looked like a general's general. Cool and poised and handsome-graying 
hair and moustache lent strength to a face unmarked by doubt-he had 
the hauteur and force of the righteous. British troops, he boasted, were 
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at the finest edge in morale and experience; the Germans were beginning 
to tire. One more drive in Flanders would finish the enemy; but a period 
of relaxation, a lull induced by sending men to far corners of the war, 
would revive German spirit and stamina. Haig wanted permission to wear 
the enemy out in Flanders. He got it. "Lloyd George felt he could not 
press his amateur opinions and over-rule him," Lord Hankey said, "and 
Haig was authorized to continue his preparations" for the first phase of 
his attack-the capture of Messines Ridge.!? 
Haig's plans and preparations should measure his military vision. Espe- 
cially in view of Nivelle's recent experiences, they should reflect Haig's 
enlarged appreciation of problems of war on the Western Front. They do. 
At 3: 10 AM, June 7, 1917, nineteen deep-sunk mines erupted under 
German positions along Messines Ridge. No sooner did the mud ebb than 
it heaved again under a barrage of 2330 guns; behind the barrage came 
80,000 Tommies of the Second Army. In three hours Messines Ridge-that 
scourging eminence which, since 1914, had dominated British lines in south- 
ern Flanders-was captured, along with 7,500 prisoners and sixty-seven guns. 
British casualties amounted to about 17,000 men.=In the euphoric aftermath 
of this splashy success, Haig asked approval to proceed with the rest of 
the Battle of Third Ypres. 
The request was a formality. He anticipated no trouble in winning final 
acceptance of a plan already approved in principle. But Lloyd George 
and the War Cabinet had grown increasingly skeptical about success in 
Flanders; the Prime Minister toyed still with intrigues for reinforcing Italy 
at the expense of Haig's legions. The general frothed in frustration, but 
at last received the government's assent. 
On July 31, the main phase of Third Ypres began. It was a11 heroic 
and awfully traditional. Division after division drove out from Ypres toward 
the town of Passchendaele, remote and important only as a dim objective. 
Waves of Tommies spilled across the Flanders ridges, gained some measure- 
less fen, died, and were replaced by comrades whose courage triumphed 
over hope. Month upon necrotic month the British oozed through mud 
and wire, lost half a million men,z' and earned, in the end, five miles of 
churned slime and the draggled village of Passchendaele. 
That sodden strip with its lost hamlet was the fruit of "wearing down"; 
it was a soiled token of persistence and so would have a touch of glory. 
But that woeful quag in Flanders told another tale of attrition, a tale of 
quenched intelligence. It stood stark testimony to Douglas Haig's splendid 
isolation. He learned nothing from the fate of his colleagues, and even 
the disaster that engulfed his ally, Nivelle, left him untutored. The Aisne, 
like the Marne, Verdun, the Sonme, taught him no new theories or tech- 
niques, not even the potential of waiting. All this experience, this shared 
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sacrifice, left his prejudices unjolted, his certainties intact. Third Ypres shows 
Haig at his best-a Bourbon on the battlefield. 
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